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A POX ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES: ENRON, 
SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE DEBATE 
CONCERNING THE RELATIVE EFFICACY OF 
MANDATORY VERSUS ENABLING RULES 
JONATHAN R. MACEY 
INTRODUCTION 
Accurate and efficient pricing of securities is necessary in order to protect 
investors and to insure that scarce capital will be allocated efficiently within 
the real economy. The U.S. securities laws reflect the deeply imbedded 
assumption that timely, full, and complete corporate disclosure of material 
information is all that is required to achieve accurate and efficient pricing of 
securities.  
This assumption is wrong. More is required. Specifically, for capital 
market pricing to function efficiently, there must be adequate “mechanisms 
of market efficiency”1 in place to ensure that available information about 
public companies is collected, processed, and transformed into trading 
strategies that efficiently move prices to accurate levels.  
In other words, for capital markets to function efficiently, more than the 
mere transmission/supply of information is required. The “demand-side” of 
the market must also function in order for securities prices to be priced 
properly.  
The main point of this Article is that the “demand-side” of U.S. capital 
markets is not functioning effectively, at least with respect to certain kinds of 
information. This, in my view, is the major lesson that should be taken from 
the recent spate of corporate debacles, most notably the collapse of the Enron 
Corporation. The “policy surprise” behind these scandals is not that there has 
been corruption inside so many U.S. companies. The “policy surprise” is that 
the vaunted U.S. capital markets did such a poor job in uncovering these 
scandals.  
The poor performance of U.S. capital markets reveals that an unexamined 
and incorrect premise underlies U.S. securities law and policy. The faulty 
premise is that disclosure, and disclosure alone, is all that is necessary to 
  J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  
 1. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman]; see also Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil 
Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776 (1972). 
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protect investors.  
The premise that disclosure alone is sufficient to protect investors was 
best, and most famously, articulated by Justice Brandeis in his observation 
that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman.”2 This disclosure philosophy is the bedrock principal on 
which all of U.S. securities law is based. This premise also serves as the 
unquestioned organizing principle behind all intellectual debate about 
securities law. The topic of this Symposium panel is a case in point. Scholars 
and policy-makers long have engaged in what has become known as the 
“mandatory versus voluntary disclosure debate” by asking whether or not 
companies should be able to “opt-into” whatever set of corporate law 
regulations they most prefer. The issue of whether or not mandatory 
disclosure is necessary for the protection of investors has been one of the 
most important debates in securities law over the years.  
In recent years, the mandatory-enabling debate has powerfully 
reincarnated itself in the form of policy arguments favoring issuer choice 
among different regulatory regimes.3 This re-opened debate centers less on 
whether disclosure should be mandatory than on whether issuers should have 
a choice among competing regulatory regimes. Advocates of issuer choice 
argue that issuers should be able to choose the securities law regime of the 
federal government, any state, or any foreign country. 
The Enron collapse demonstrates, however, that the “sunlight” that 
disclosure brings about is useful only if market mechanisms are in place that 
are capable of observing and interpreting the information that the “sunlight” 
brings into view. And this is true regardless of whether disclosures are made 
voluntarily or subject to a mandatory disclosure regime. 
In other words, disclosure is a necessary but insufficient condition to 
accomplish the objective of ensuring that market prices are efficient. There 
must also be in place an adequate infrastructure to receive, analyze, and 
interpret the information that is disclosed so that such information quickly 
will be transformed into an effective trading strategy that will, in turn, cause 
securities prices to move to prices that reflect the potential risks and rewards 
associated with investing.  
Using Enron as an object lesson in the things that can go wrong with 
public disclosures, the first part of this Article makes the argument that the 
capital market mechanisms that are supposed to insure accurate and efficient 
 2. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1932) 
[hereinafter BRANDEIS]. 
 3. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2002). 
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share prices are not functioning properly. The second part of this Article 
discusses the reasons why this fundamental component in our system of 
corporate governance is not performing as well as it should. In the final 
section, I offer my views on whether there is anything in the debate over 
mandatory disclosure that can help us to resolve the current problems in the 
U.S. system of financial reporting. 
I. ENRON, EARLY WARNING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As noted above, for decades, there has been a debate in the U.S. between 
“market-oriented” scholars who take the view that mandatory disclosure is 
unnecessary because market forces provide plenty of incentives for firms 
voluntarily to disclose relevant information to the public, and “traditional” 
legal scholars who take the view that mandatory disclosure is required to 
ensure that investors receive all of the information necessary to make 
informed investment decisions. Recent events reveal a serious flaw in the 
arguments of both sides in this debate. Specifically, both sides embraced the 
erroneous view that once adequate disclosures were made (either voluntarily 
or because such disclosures were mandated), market forces, operating in the 
form of so-called “mechanisms of market efficiency,”4 would move 
securities prices to their correct levels.5  
Unfortunately, these “mechanisms of market efficiency” are not 
functioning properly. Those who think that disclosure should be mandatory 
and those who think it should be voluntary have assumed, erroneously, as it 
turns out, that once disclosures were made, the market would take care of the 
rest. Disclosure is both irrelevant and meaningless unless somebody is acting 
upon the information being disclosed.  
In the Enron collapse, the U.S. mandatory reporting system worked fairly 
well. While the disclosure system did not work perfectly, or even 
exceptionally well, Enron did make disclosures that should have led 
reasonable market participants to uncover grave problems within the 
company. Thus, the corporate governance problem that Enron unmasked was 
not a problem with the controversial U.S. system of mandatory disclosure. 
Rather, the problem was that the market did an astonishingly poor job of both 
interpreting Enron’s disclosures and “decoding” the information contained in 
the trades conducted by Enron insiders.6  
 4. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 565-66. 
 5. BRANDEIS, supra note 2, at 92. 
 6. “Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean trading information by directly 
observing the transactions of informed traders.” Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 573; Myron S. 
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In this section of the Article, I wish to make two simple observations that 
appear to have gone completely unnoticed in the debates about disclosure 
rules in the wake of Enron. 
A. Corporate Disclosures: “Receivers are as Important as Senders” 
The first observation is that listening is as important, if not more 
important, than talking. In the disclosure context, this means that in order for 
an economy to have an adequate system of financial reporting, it is not 
enough that companies make disclosures of financial information. In 
addition, it is vital that there be set of financial intermediaries, who are at 
least as competent and sophisticated at receiving, processing, and interpreting 
financial information (and other information about company performance) as 
the companies are at delivering it. Enron’s collapse demonstrated the 
breakdown of both the infrastructure that generated information about 
corporate performance, as well as the infrastructure that was supposed to 
process and interpret that information.  
This simultaneous breakdown in the systems of developing/sending and 
receiving/interpreting disclosures of corporate information is particularly 
troubling in the context of the debate about whether such disclosure should 
be mandatory or voluntary. On the one hand, the system of developing and 
sending the information is a mandatory system. As is well known, the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and particularly 
the rules promulgated thereunder, such as SEC Rule 10b-5 and Regulation 
FD, constitute an elaborate system of mandatory disclosure that, until 
recently, was viewed as the envy of the world. The failure of this system does 
not reflect well on the efficacy of mandatory disclosure systems.  
On the other hand, the system of receiving and interpreting disclosures of 
corporate information is a voluntary, market-driven regime. Just as 
government-mandated command-and-control systems exist for producing 
information about public companies, competition among rival financial 
intermediaries is supposed to insure that such information is properly 
analyzed and reflected in firms’ share prices. The economics of this free-
market arrangement are simple: the financial markets offer massive gains to 
intermediaries who can interpret public disclosures and translate that 
information into effective trading strategies. To the extent that the disclosures 
Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information 
on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179 (1972) (showing that trading changes share prices by releasing 
information into the market, rather than by putting “price pressure” on stocks through changes in the 
supply or demand for shares). 
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produced by the mandatory rules indicate that current securities prices do not 
accurately reflect the present value to securities holders of owning such 
securities, profits from risk arbitrage are possible. The profits associated with 
buying under-priced securities and selling over-priced securities should, in 
theory, provide ample incentives for financial intermediaries to invest in 
interpreting the information disclosed by public companies. 
Thus, my first simple observation is that the recent string of corporate 
debacles, led by Enron, should be a humbling episode, not only for those 
who believe in the efficacy of the current system of mandatory reporting but 
also for those who champion the efficacy of a more laissez-faire approach. 
Of course, one might argue that, regardless of how efficient the market 
intermediaries who receive corporate information are, they will fail in their 
efforts if the information they receive from corporations is tainted by fraud, 
either in the form of outright misrepresentations or in the form of omissions 
of important information that is necessary to gain a full understanding of the 
financial condition of the company being analyzed. However, as I will show 
in the following section of this Article, I think that it is clear, at least in the 
case of Enron, that despite the failure in the quality of the (mandatory) 
reporting generated by Enron, the company’s problems could have been 
discovered by diligent intermediaries much earlier.  
B. Corporate Governance and Culture: Greed Is Not Always Good 
My second simple observation relates to the likely incidence of fraud in 
the financial systems. The recent, seemingly unremitting, series of financial 
scandals, which includes, among others, Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing, 
Tyco, WorldCom, and Xerox might lead some to believe that no companies 
can be trusted because all of corporate America is crooked. Unfortunately, 
this perspective is not only wrong, but it also takes attention away from what 
I believe is a much more important and interesting issue. It seems pretty clear 
that most corporate executives and directors are honest. The interesting and 
important question: is why are they honest? There are at least two competing 
hypotheses.  
The first possible explanation for the generally high levels of honesty in 
corporate America is that the vaunted—and enormously expensive—system 
of checks and balances that comprises the U.S. system of corporate 
governance usually prevents managers from going astray. This system of 
corporate governance is comprised of a number of well-paid components, 
including corporate boards of directors, audit committees on boards, outside 
accounting firms, law firms, state and federal securities regulators, stock 
exchanges, financial analysts, commercial lenders, credit rating agencies, the 
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Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), hedge funds and 
miscellaneous other short-sellers. Unfortunately, one of the object lessons in 
the Enron collapse is that every component in this complex corporate 
governance infrastructure is fundamentally broken. If but one of these 
components had worked properly, Enron would not have been able to 
deceive the investing public in the way that it did. But Enron’s board of 
directors and its audit committee turned a blind eye to the financial 
shenanigans perpetrated by Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, 
and others. The audit engagement team from Arthur Andersen, led by David 
Duncan, and the company’s outside counsel, were completely captured by 
Enron. As a result, they failed to provide the independent, “gatekeeper” 
function that investors were told they were entitled to expect.  
Similarly, lenders appeared to be more concerned with keeping Enron’s 
business than with conducting the due diligence that would have revealed 
problems at Enron. FASB was apparently captured by the accounting 
profession. Over time, those responsible for developing basic accounting 
principles lost sight of (or gave up on attaining) the goal of developing 
accounting rules that required companies to provide an accurate overall 
assessment of their financial condition. Instead, the accounting rules for 
public companies morphed into a set of highly technical provisions more 
likely to obfuscate than to illuminate the true financial condition of reporting 
companies.  
Hedge funds and other likely short sellers missed a bonanza in failing to 
identify Enron’s problems in a timely way. Similarly, the credit rating 
agencies also failed to recognize Enron’s troubles, despite their privileged 
access to non-public, material information about the companies to whom 
they provide credit ratings. Strikingly, there is absolutely no reason to believe 
that the financial intermediaries that interacted with Enron were any different 
than their competitors. The law firm, the accounting firm, the directors, the 
regulators, and the financial intermediaries responsible for monitoring Enron 
were not pathological outliers on the U.S. corporate governance. They were 
typical. 
In other words, in my view, the story of the rise and fall of Enron suggests 
that the billions spent on legally mandated corporate governance systems and 
regulatory infrastructure in the U.S. may be largely a dead weight social loss. 
Investors pay dearly for such systems and infrastructure but do not receive 
the safeguards and other protections they are told they might receive. Rather, 
the meaningful protection for investors is largely religious, sociological, and 
cultural. There are strong religious, sociological, and cultural norms against 
lying, cheating, and stealing. People care a lot about how they are perceived. 
Corporate managers and directors, in particular, have made significant 
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investments in reputation. These factors cause officers and directors to be 
honest. Accordingly, the generally high levels of honesty in the way that 
business is conducted in the U.S. is attributable to the fact that most (though 
clearly not all) top managers and directors have developed a strong taste for 
honesty and forthrightness.  
The critical question is how much more honesty do corporate governance 
regulations generate beyond that which is attributable to religiously, 
culturally, and sociologically induced incentive structures. At the margin, the 
U.S. system of mandatory corporate governance regulations appears to 
contribute little, or nothing. It seems clear that, in its current form, the costs 
of this system are not worth the benefits. Take for example, the (mandatory) 
provision in U.S. law that requires public companies to produce financial 
statements that have been audited by independent accounting firms.7 This 
requirement is based on the premise that independent accounting firms are 
unlikely to permit their clients to make material misrepresentations of their 
financial condition. Independent accounting firms are thought to be unlikely 
to permit (or acquiesce in) fraud because it is not in their economic interests 
to do so. The gains from participating with a client in any such fraud are, in 
theory, greatly outweighed by the losses to the accounting firm’s reputation 
that would follow from being implicated in a fraudulent accounting scheme. 
Unfortunately a combination of factors, including: (a) the consolidation of 
the accounting industry into a highly concentrated cartel-like structure; (b) 
the elimination of accounting firm partners’ incentives to monitor their firms 
due to the transformation of accounting firms from general partnerships to 
limited liability partnerships; and (c) the organization of accounting firms 
into audit teams comprised of auditors who serve only one corporate client, 
led to the demise of the public accounting firm as a gatekeeper.8 
In a variety of other ways that have recently played themselves out on the 
public stage, many other elements of the U.S. system of corporate 
governance became corrupted, at least temporarily. Anthropology in the form 
of cultural studies, and not economics in the form of systems of incentives, 
protected the U.S. investing public from plunder at the hands of the managers 
and directors to whom it entrusted its fortunes during that time-frame. The 
scariest lesson of Enron, then, is that if managers ever come actually to 
believe the lie that “Greed is Good,” the U.S. will be in real trouble. 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa sched. A, ¶ 25. For a full discussion of accounting within the context of 
Enron, see Jonathan R. Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Commodification, Independence, and Governance: 
Preliminary Observations on the Demise of Professionalism in the Accounting Profession, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 1167 (2003) [hereinafter Macey & Sale]. 
 8. See id. at 1176-78.  
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Fraud is not easy to detect. Thus, before concluding that the U.S. system 
of corporate governance has truly failed, it is worth asking whether it would 
have been possible to glean the true financial condition of Enron from the 
admittedly flawed public disclosures that the company made prior to its 
collapse.  
Today, lots of people point to defects in Enron’s financial disclosures 
that, they claim, they could have detected had they bothered to study the 
company prior to its bankruptcy filing. Typical of the “know-it-all” approach 
are statements by Ramu Thiagarajan, who is engaged in “Stock-Selection 
Research” at Mellon Capital Management. Thiagarajan told the New York 
Times that he spotted trouble at Enron “10 months before it blew up.”9 He 
also stated that “[t]here were quite a few red flags on the financials: gross 
margins were declining, interest coverage was getting worse, [and] return on 
sales was deteriorating.”10 Hindsight is 20-20, and these statements are 
rendered far less impressive by the fact that they were made in October, 
2002, a full year after Enron’s bankruptcy filing and only after the 
information had been firmly incorporated into Enron’s share price.  
On the other hand, there is strong contemporaneous evidence that even 
amateur observers, as long as they were independent, were able to detect the 
problems in Enron much earlier than the collapse of the company.11 Here I 
adduce evidence from three sources: (a) Enron’s own tax accounting, which, 
presented the company’s financial condition far more accurately than its 
corrupted GAAP/SEC reporting; (b) investigations by business school 
students at Cornell’s Johnson Graduate School of Business in 1998 that 
indicated a high probability that Enron was manipulating its earnings long 
before any other analysts or investigators uncovered wrong-doing at Enron; 
and (c) reports by the public press, particularly the Texas edition of the Wall 
Street Journal.  
 9. Gretchen Morgenson, With Earnings It’s Not Just the Quantity but the Quality, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 2002, at § 3, 1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. For a discussion of whether sophisticated investors generally are able to detect accounting 
problems (earnings management) in a sample of 13,555 publicly-traded terms, see Yan Zhang, Do 
Speculative Short Sellers Detect Earnings Management, (Nov. 21, 2002) (manuscript on file with 
author), available at http://www.bus.lsu.edu/accounting/Workshop_Papers/Short%20Sellers%20and 
%20Earnings%20Manangement.pdf [hereinafter Zhang]. 
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C. Enron’s Tax Accounting 
During the years that Enron was reporting massive earnings and return on 
equity, it was not paying any taxes.12 The reason that the company wasn’t 
paying taxes was that it did not have any income. As Victor Fleischer has 
observed in TAX NOTES, the key to the discrepancy between Enron’s 
earnings from a tax perspective and Enron’s earnings from an SEC/GAAP 
perspective lies in the vaunted, off-balance sheet Special Purpose Entities 
(SPEs) which were limited partnership arrangements that Enron used to book 
fictitious earnings and move debt off of its balance sheet.13  
Under these arrangements, Enron would create an SPE and “buy” 97 
percent of the equity in the entity in exchange for giving the entity some 
illiquid asset of highly uncertain value that Enron wanted to clear off its 
balance sheet. For SEC/GAAP purposes, this arrangement would permit 
Enron to move the asset off its balance sheet and even show a profit on its 
sale, so long as 3 percent of the equity in the SPE was owned by 
independent, outside investors. Even better, the SPEs generally would 
borrow money from outside lenders and channel the loan proceeds back to 
Enron, thereby improving Enron’s cash position.  
The tax system specifies a much more sound basis for dealing with these 
transactions than GAAP. As Professor Fleischer observes, tax accounting did 
not permit Enron to recognize a gain on these transactions: 
For tax purposes it’s basically a non-event. As well it should be. From 
an economic perspective, Enron’s position has changed very little 
regarding the asset—it still carries virtually all of the opportunity for 
gain and risk of loss. So the tax system concludes that we should wait 
and see what the asset is really worth before requiring the payment of 
tax. If and when the partners exit the investment by selling to a third 
party, that’s when the tax system recognizes a true event, the income 
flows through to the partners and the partners pay the tax.14 
What is truly perplexing here is the fact that no financial analyst, hedge 
fund operator, or other securities market intermediary thought that the 
 12. Citizens for Tax Justice, Less Than Zero: Enron’s Corporate Income Tax Payments, 1996-
2000, Jan. 17, 2002, at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/enron.pdf; David Cay Johnston, Enron Avoided Income 
Taxes in 4 of 5 Years,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A1. 
 13. Victor Fleischer, Enron’s Dirty Tax Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 94 TAX 
NOTES 1045 (Feb. 25, 2002). 
 14. Id. at 1046 (emphasis in original). Technically, I.R.C. Section 721 makes Enron’s 
contribution of property to the partnership/SPE in exchange for a partnership interest a non-recognition 
event.  
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discrepancy between Enron’s tax reporting and its SEC/GAAP reporting 
raised any red flags. Apparently, to the extent that people observed the 
discrepancy, they simply presumed that the SEC/GAAP reporting provided a 
more accurate depiction of Enron’s financial condition than the company’s 
reporting to the IRS. But the SEC/GAAP accounting appears to be flawed to 
its core because Enron is able to realize a gain for the sale of an asset, despite 
the fact that the company remained financially “on the hook” for the asset.15 
D. Business School Students 
On May 5, 1998, students at Cornell’s Johnson Graduate School of 
Management, using publicly available data, published an investment report 
on Enron. This report indicated significant problems in Enron far earlier than 
professional investors and other financial intermediaries did.16 The report 
recommended that investors sell Enron stock, based, among other things, on 
the recognition that the net income available to common stock had fallen by 
85% during the prior year. Even more tantalizing, by employing the multi-
variable Beneish Model17 for detecting earnings manipulation using publicly 
reported accounting data, the MBA students found that Enron, “may be 
manipulating earnings,” based primarily on suspicious growth in sales 
figures.18 Subsequent to Enron’s collapse, accountants, utilizing the Beneish 
 15. See id. at 1046. 
 16. Cornell University, Johnson School of Management, Enron Report, at http://parkercenter. 
johnson.cornell.edu/pdf_files/enron.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). 
 17. The Model is named for its originator, Messod D. Beneish. See Messod D. Beneish, The 
Detection of Earnings Manipulation, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sep./Oct. 1999, at 24. For an accessible 
description of the operation of the Model, see Beneish Model, at http://www.univ-
lille2.fr/afie/afigr5/pdf/ beneishmodel.pdf.  
 18. The Beneish Model uses accounting measures to generate a statistical model that identifies 
earnings manipulation in financial reporting. The Model finds indications of earnings manipulation 
whenever management violates GAAP in order to artificially increase the firm’s financial performance 
as compared to the firm’s performance under GAAP. The Model uses financial statement data to 
capture both the effects of manipulations and the preconditions for manipulation that may prompt 
firms to engage in manipulation.  
 The Beneish Model contains nine variables that are each presumed positively to affect the 
likelihood of manipulations: (1) Days Sales in Receivables (DSRI); (2) Days Sales in Inventory 
(DSINV) (a large increase in days’ sales in receivables or a large increase in inventory raises the 
likelihood that receivables and inventory, and thus earnings and sales, are inflated); (3) Asset Quality 
Inventory (AQI) (an increase in asset realization risk analysis indicates an increased propensity to 
capitalize and thus defer costs); (4) Sales Growth Index (SGI) (computed by dividing the current 
period’s sales by the last period’s, SGI is considered to be the first indication in a slowdown of the 
firm’s performance); (5) Gross Margin Index (GMI) (determines whether gross margins have 
deteriorated, a negative signal about the firm’s prospects which can lead the firm to manipulate 
earnings); (6) Sales General and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) (changes in SGA expenses 
relative to sales); (7) Depreciation Index (DEPI) (changes in the rate of depreciation of assets)); and 
(8) Leverage Index (LVGI) (change in the company’s leverage (total debt to total assets); (9) Working 
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Model in retrospect, found earnings quality problems at Enron for every year 
since 1995 and the significant probability of earnings manipulation as early 
as 1996 due to problems in revenues, margins, asset quality, and sales.19 The 
question of course, is: why were none of the bona-fide and highly 
incentivized professionals utilizing the Beneish Model, or other 
methodologies, to uncover the financial problems at Enron?  
E. Enron, the Financial Press and Market Efficiency 
One of the most stunning aspects of the Enron collapse is the fact that 
Enron’s problems were uncovered by the financial press before they were 
uncovered by financial intermediaries. This is surprising because the 
intermediaries’ economic returns for uncovering financial fraud (which come 
in the form of arbitrage and other trading gains) would appear to be 
dramatically higher than the economic returns to the financial press (who are 
paid fixed salaries and generally prohibited from trading in advance of their 
stories). In particular, the now-defunct Texas edition of the WALL STREET 
JOURNAL beat Enron’s board of directors and audit committee, the credit 
rating agencies following Enron, Arthur Andersen (Enron’s accounting firm), 
stock market analysts, and most interestingly, short-sellers and hedge fund 
operators in the race to identify the problems within Enron.20 
Jim Chanos, the well-known analyst who began carefully to scrutinize 
Enron’s financial statements in September 2000, started trading at the height 
of Enron’s success. Chanos decided that Enron, which currently was trading 
at 60 times earnings, was vastly overvalued. Chanos believed that the 
Company should trade more like a hedge fund than an energy company 
because it relied on trading for more than 80% of its earnings.21 Chanos 
reasoned that there were lots of other, better performing hedge funds, whose 
shares were priced attractively relative to Enron’s. Moreover, using publicly 
available documents, Chanos calculated that Enron was earning only 7 
percent on capital, as compared with an average cost of capital of 10 
percent.22  
Capital to Total Assets (WCATA) (captures the extent to which accounting earnings are cash based). 
Messod Beneish, Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings Management 
Among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance, 16 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (1997).  
 19. Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial Reporting 
Failure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (2003).  
 20. Jonathan Weil, Energy Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math Is Missing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
20, 2000, at T1, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26610344 [hereinafter Weil]. 
 21. Jonathan R. Laing, The Bear That Roared: How Short-Seller Jim Chanos Helped Expose 
Enron, BARRON’S, Jan. 28, 2002, at 18, available at 2002 WL-Barrons 7653628. 
 22. Id. 
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Interestingly, it appears that Chanos got the inspiration to look more 
closely into Enron by reading a September 2000 article in the (now defunct) 
Texas edition of the WALL STREET JOURNAL.23 This article raised questions 
about the quality of the earnings at Enron and a number of other companies 
with large energy trading departments. The article pointed out that investors 
may not realize that Enron’s large reported profits were in the form of large, 
unrealized, noncash gains. Changes in market conditions could wipe out 
these profits. For example, the article pointed out that Enron had “booked 
$747 million in unrealized gains from risk-management activities during the 
second quarter [of 2000], more than the company’s total $609 million in 
earnings before taxes and interest.”24 In other words, if these unrealized gains 
had not been reported, Enron would have suffered a loss for the quarter 
instead of the 26% increase in earnings it actually reported.25 
Enron’s financials did not reveal that two-thirds of the company’s debt 
was not disclosed on the company’s balance sheet. However, Enron’s 
Annual Reports (on Form 10-K) and Quarterly Reports (on Form 10-Q) 
revealed that an unnamed “senior officer” of Enron was in charge of limited 
partnerships that had engaged in a large number of transactions with the 
Company, all of which had the effect of removing assets from Enron’s books 
and providing Enron with revenue.26 For this reason, in February, 2001, 
when Enron was trading at around $80 per share, Chanos chose Enron as one 
of the two stocks he identified at his firm’s annual “Bears in Hibernation” 
meeting in Miami.27 Chanos’s original inspiration for his profitable trading 
strategy, however, was the WALL STREET JOURNAL. 
II. PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Clearly, the problem at Enron was that the firms, individuals, and 
institutions that were supposed to have been monitoring the company were 
not performing in accordance with the market’s or society’s hopes and 
expectations. There are two structural constraints that financial engineers and 
policy-makers face when they design a system of corporate governance: the 
problem of “capture” and the problem of access to high-quality information.  
The “capture” problem arises when a monitor becomes too close to the 
managers of the firm it is supposed to be monitoring. This problem stems 
 23. Weil, supra note 20, at T1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. The identity of this partner was revealed in October 2001 to be Andrew Fastow, Enron’s 
Chief Financial Officer. Id. 
 
 27. Id. 
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from the fact that, for monitors to be effective, they must be objective.28 
Unfortunately, monitors that become too close to the firm they are supposed 
to monitor risk losing their objectivity.  
 
 
The solution to the problem of “capture” that plagues “proximate” 
monitors is to have monitors maintain their distance from the firms they are 
monitoring and hence retain their objectivity. But this characteristic of 
objectivity presents its own, unique structural problems for those who wish to 
design an effective system of corporate governance. Put simply, it is not 
enough for monitors merely to be objective. To be successful, monitors must 
have high quality information about the companies they are covering in order 
to monitor them effectively. But paradoxically, with distance comes not only 
the positive characteristic of objectivity but also the negative characteristic of 
low-quality information.  
Thus, from an engineering and design perspective, there is a basic trade-
off between proximity and objectivity in corporate governance. Proximate 
monitors are unlikely to be objective because of their susceptibility to 
capture. Objective monitors are unlikely to have sufficiently timely, reliable 
information about what is going on within the companies they are monitoring 
because their distance from the decision-making process necessarily denies 
them access to real-time information about corporate decisions as such 
decisions are being made.  
In designing an effective system of corporate governance, it is critical to 
be aware of the trade-off between proximity and objectivity. The problem, of 
course, is that as monitors become more proximate, they tend to lose their 
objectivity, and as monitors become more objective, they tend to lose the 
high-quality, real-time information that comes only to those in close 
proximity to the issuer whose results they are trying to analyze.  
From this perspective, the U.S. system and the European systems of 
corporate governance have always appeared to be a study in contrasts. The 
European system is characterized by relatively high proportions of insiders 
on boards, as well as by extensive patterns of cross-shareholdings among 
large institutional investors. In this system, monitors appear to be quite close 
(proximate) to management, but often lack objectivity. By contrast, the U.S. 
system is characterized by relatively high proportions of outside directors, as 
well as by systems of independent monitors, such as hedge funds and the 
market for corporate control. These outside monitors do not have access to 
high quality inside information, nor do they participate in the internal 
 28. Arnoud Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Objectivity, Proximity and Corporate Governance, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming January 2004, draft on file with author) [hereinafter Boot & Macey].  
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decision-making processes within firms to the extent that European investor-
owners do. But these U.S. outsiders were at least thought to be unbiased and 
objective.  
The problem, which has become excruciatingly obvious in retrospect, is 
that over time, the supposedly independent outside monitors that 
characterized the U.S. system of corporate governance have become 
captured, conflicted, or co-opted by the firms for which they were supposed 
to act as gatekeepers. Those who were not financially conflicted, including 
journalists and business school students, performed well. However, as 
discussed above, lawyers and accountants, who were supposed to be 
objective and independent, became co-opted. Analysts apparently traded 
strong ratings for issuers (along with their own reputations) in exchange for 
the prospect of earning generous bonuses for helping their own firms garner 
business from issuers, who, in turn, supplied such business in exchange for 
optimistic ratings from analysts.  
The problem with credit rating agencies is that these agencies become 
“captured” by issuers, not because they are beholden to the issuers for 
business, but because issuers make it impossible for rating agencies to 
downgrade them. This is because for many, if not most, publicly traded 
companies, being downgraded by one of the credit rating agencies makes 
bankruptcy a foregone conclusion by signaling that the company can no 
longer raise the debt necessary to support its operations. In other words, 
when a company such as Enron receives a downgrade from a credit rating 
agency, it can no longer receive the credit it needs to finance its operations. 
Suppliers and trading counter-parties demand payment in advance, and the 
firm collapses because its creditors cut off the firm’s liquidity. In many other 
corporations, including Enron, the company’s public debt goes into technical 
default whenever the debt is downgraded below a certain rating level, usually 
investment-grade. In this situation, a downgrade can cause bankruptcy 
directly, by literally causing the company to be in default on its debt 
obligations and triggering repayment of hundreds of millions of dollars of 
debt. 
Because a downgrade by a rating agency is like a corporate nuclear bomb, 
the credit rating agencies are extremely reluctant to use their power. This, in 
turn, undermines the efficacy of credit ratings as a corporate governance 
device. In the case of Enron, the value of the Corporation’s $250 million in 
rated Senior Unsecured debt had declined from $0.90 cents on the dollar to 
$0.35 cents on the dollar in the month preceding the downgrade. In other 
words, the market had rejected the notion that Enron’s debt was investment 
grade before the credit rating agencies got around to downgrading the 
company. The credit ratings agencies were unwilling to downgrade Enron’s 
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debt below investment-grade status because such a downgrade would have 
triggered Enron’s debt covenants, thereby making the principal and interest 
on such debt due immediately. In other words credit rating agencies had 
become victims of their own success.  
In the Enron post-mortem, no corporate governance institution is of 
greater interest to the mandatory disclosure debate than the firm’s board of 
directors. On paper, the Enron board appeared to be both competent and 
independent. The audit committee was led by Robert Jaedicke, a giant in the 
field of academic accounting and a model of independence. At the time of his 
board services, Jaedicke resided in California and was Professor of 
Accounting Emeritus and former Dean of the Graduate School of Business at 
Stanford University. Other board members had equally impressive 
credentials. Among them were a former Chairman of the Executive 
Committee of Gulf & Western Industries, a former Chairman of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the former United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Energy.29 
Despite that wealth of experience, these directors did little or nothing for 
Enron’s shareholders.30 From the “proximity-objectivity” perspective 
presented here, the Enron collapse raises the issue of whether it is even 
possible for public companies to organize boards of directors that, unlike the 
Enron board, are impervious to capture by management. The problem is that 
boards, by definition, exist in a space that is proximate to management. In the 
ordinary course of events, prospective board members are asked by a 
representative of the company (a manager, a head-hunter, or a sitting board 
member) to serve on the company’s board. The very act of accepting an offer 
to stand for a seat on a corporate board is often, in a very real sense, an 
endorsement of the quality and integrity of incumbent management. Once on 
a board, directors inevitably become closely aligned with management. 
Directors decide whether to retain managers. And, of course the decision to 
retain a particular management team constitutes an endorsement of 
management’s practices. When managers bring issues to the board for their 
approval, such approval constitutes further co-option of the board. In other 
words, over time, even the most independent director becomes aligned with 
managers. Management failure inevitably is a bad reflection on the board that 
has endorsed the continued employment of the management team. This is 
especially true when a board has been in place during a management 
 29. See Sen. Joseph Lieberman, The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse, 
Statement (May 7, 2003), at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/050702lieberman.htm (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2003). 
 30. Id. 
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transition and is thus directly responsible for not only retaining management 
but also for identifying, selecting, and recruiting the managers. On the basis 
of considerable support from the field of social psychology, I have observed 
previously: 
[O]nce boards of directors have been in place for a while, they are 
likely to embrace management’s perspective. More specifically, after a 
decision is made and defended by a board, it will affect future 
decisions such that those decisions will comport with earlier actions. 
For example, studies of the decision-making process that contributed 
to the escalation of the Vietnam War showed that leaders paid more 
attention to new information that was compatible with the earlier 
decisions. They tended to ignore information that contradicted those 
earlier assumptions. As one researcher observed, “there was a 
tendency, when actions were out of line with ideas for decision-
makers to align their actions.” Once ideas and beliefs become 
ingrained in the mind of a board of directors, the possibility of altering 
those beliefs decreases substantially. As Tom Gilovich has argued, 
“beliefs are like possessions, and when someone challenges our 
beliefs, it is as if someone criticized our possessions.”31 
The nature of proximity makes the probability of director capture 
extremely high. The question whether it is reasonable, in light of this analysis 
and recent experience, to rely on even the most well-meaning boards of 
directors as a source of independence from management is subject to 
considerable doubt.  
A. The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Revisited 
Proximate monitors cannot always be trusted because of their 
susceptibility to capture. Certain ostensibly objective monitors (like outside 
accountants and outside counsel to the company) are highly susceptible to 
capture because of their sustained interaction with the management of the 
firms they are supposed to monitor. But one group of objective monitors, 
market trading professionals, do not have interactions with the firms they are 
supposed to monitor. This group is thought to be crucial to making securities 
markets efficient. A full accounting of Enron’s collapse must consider why 
this group failed so miserably to detect the problems at Enron in a timely 
fashion.  
 31. Boot & Macey, supra note 28.  
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Market professionals are thought to be the critical “mechanism” of market 
efficiency. These market professionals, who constitute the “dominant 
minority of informed traders,” is comprised of: 
the community of market professionals, such as arbitrageurs, 
researchers, brokers and portfolio managers, who devote their careers 
to acquiring information and honing evaluative skills. The trading 
volume in most securities that these professionals control, directly or 
indirectly, seems sufficient to assure the market’s rapid assimilation 
into price of most routine information.32 
The list in the above block quotation should be expanded to include hedge 
funds,33 which have become a major market force in recent years.34 While 
some of these market professionals, particularly analysts, were subject to 
acute conflicts of interest that caused them to be “captured” by issuers such 
as Enron, there were hundreds, if not thousands of market professionals, 
including professional short-sellers35 and managers of hedge funds, who 
were not subject to capture by Enron because they had no connection with 
Enron whatsoever.  
A critical question is, therefore: where were these independent market 
professionals during the Enron collapse? The question is intriguing because 
these market professionals left billions of dollars in potential trading profits 
“on the table” by failing to recognize the acute problems at Enron and 
transform this realization into a profitable trading strategy. Why did market 
 32. Gilson & Kraakmen, supra note 1, at 571. 
 33. A hedge fund is a private investment fund (usually held by affluent individuals and 
institutions) that utilizes aggressive investment strategies, including some that are off-limits to publicly 
traded investment funds, such as mutual funds. Hedge funds engage in practices such as selling short, 
leverage, program trading, swaps, arbitrage, and derivatives. Hedge funds are limited by law to fewer 
than 100 investors. Hedge fund participants usually invest a minimum of $1 million. “The general 
partner usually receives performance-based compensation.” Hedge Funds Defined, at http://www. 
sophiaorange.com/hedge_funds_defined.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). 
 34. There are an estimated 5,000 hedge funds active in the U.S., with between $400 and $500 
billion under management. Hedge funds are the fastest growing sector of the financial services 
industry, with growth of approximately 20% annually. Michael Plunkett, SVP-Hedge Funds, June 13, 
2002, at http://www.instinet.com/ir/managment_presentations/investor_day/plunkett.061202.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2003).  
 35. Short selling is the sale of a security that the seller does not own (and has not contracted to 
buy) at the time of the sale. Traders who “sell short” must borrow the security that they have sold from 
their broker in order to make delivery to the purchaser. Short sellers must then pay their broker interest 
on the securities borrowed. Short sellers can profit when the price of the security they have sold and 
borrowed drops after the sale, allowing the seller to purchase the security necessary to repay the lender 
at a lesser cost than the value of the shares at the time they were borrowed (a process known as 
“covering”). The profit equals the difference between the sales price and the sum of: (a) the cost of the 
security purchased; (b) the interest payments on the stock borrowed by the short seller; (c) taxes on the 
gain received in the short selling; and (d) transaction costs.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p329 Macey book pages.doc10/24/03   12:15 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
346 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:329 
 
 
 
 
 
professionals not make profits by short-selling Enron when its shares were 
overvalued? 
One fascinating characteristic of securities markets (which casts 
considerable doubt on the validity of the theory that securities markets are 
universally efficient) is that in the real world, “[r]emarkably few shares are in 
fact sold short.”36 Using data from the New York Stock Exchange, where 
Enron’s stock was traded prior to its collapse, Professor Robert Shiller 
reports that short sellers accounted for only between .14 percent and 1.91 
percent of all shares from 1977-2000.37 And Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, 
and Sloan report that less than two percent of all stocks had short interest 
greater than five percent of shares outstanding during the period 1976-
1993.38 As Professor Shiller has observed:  
[G]iven the obviously large difference of opinion about and difference 
of public attention to different stocks, it is hard to see how such a 
small amount of short selling could offset the effect on stock price of 
the extra demand of investors who develop an irrational fixation on 
certain stocks.39 
Restrictions on short-selling “could be a fatal flaw in the basic efficient 
markets theory.”40 One major difference between buying securities and 
selling securities short is that investors enjoy a limit on the extent of their 
liability when they buy, but face (theoretically) infinite exposure when they 
sell short, because there is no (theoretical) limit on the price to which a 
security might rise, and thus no limitation (again, in theory) on the price at 
which a short seller might be forced to cover. Simple risk aversion will, 
therefore, keep investors away from short selling. 
Because of the perceived risk of short-selling problems, regulators “have 
established strict rules to monitor short-selling activities due to this special 
risk return profile of short-selling.”41 Further, many institutional investors 
and corporate insiders are prevented by contract from short-selling.42 
Utilizing Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory,43 and evidence of the 
 36. Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 83, 101 (2003) [hereinafter Shiller]. 
 37. Id. at 101. 
 38. Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Lisa Muelbroek, and Richard G. Sloan, Short-Sellers, 
Fundamental Analysis and Stock Returns, at http://jfe.rochester.edu/2k243.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 
2003). 
 39. Shiller, supra note 36, at 101. 
 40. Id. at 98. 
 41. Zhang, supra note 11, at 7. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
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acute “pain of regret,” Professor Shiller has posited that because individuals 
become more upset by losses than they become pleased by gains, short-
sellers tend to lose disproportionate amounts of money short selling because 
they are reluctant to cover their losses.  
It also seems clear that short-selling is subtly discouraged. There is a 
social stigma attached to it. The general public—and policy—makers have 
exhibited a consistent hostility to short sellers (on whom the stock market 
crash of 1929 was blamed).44 And short-selling is regulated in the form of the 
“up-tick” rule, which makes it illegal to sell-short when the stock is falling—
specifically, when the last trade price is lower than the immediately 
preceding price. This rule has particular force in cases like Enron, when the 
stock starts to fall dramatically.45 Regulators probably scrutinize short-selling 
to a greater extent than they scrutinize other trading activity.  
Needless to say, the tax code does not help short sellers. Ironically, the 
interest that short sellers must pay on the stock they borrow is not deductible 
when the short seller loses money because the Internal Revenue Code 
requires that interest payments, to be deductible, must be offset against a 
corresponding gain. When the underlying shares rise in price, and the short 
seller loses money, there is no gain against which the short seller can offset 
his losses.46 In addition, the tax rules are written so as to make most profits 
on short selling short-term capital gains, rather than more advantageous long-
term capital gains, regardless of the length of time that a trader keeps open 
her short position. This tax consequence occurs because the timing for capital 
gains purposes is calculated by measuring the (usually short) time period 
between the date on which the short seller buys shares to cover her “short” 
and the date on which she then delivers the purchased shares to the firm that 
loaned her the shares. It would make more economic sense and encourage 
short-selling if the period were instead calculated by measuring the 
(generally far longer) time period between the date on which the short seller 
initially sells the shares that she borrowed from her broker and the date on 
which the short seller buys the shares to repay them to her broker.47 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 44. JOSEPH A. WALKER, SELLING SHORT (1991); Douglas Diamond & Robert Verrecchia, 
Constraints on Short Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to New Information, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 277 
(1987); Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Stock Returns (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8494) (2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8494. 
 45. Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell, & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis 
of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
799 (1989). 
 46. I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 2003). 
 47. I.R.C. § 1233 (West 2003). Generally, a gain or loss is not realized until the property is 
delivered to close the short sale. The holding period is determined by the amount of time the property 
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To the extent that short-selling is relatively rare and costly, bubbles and 
financial fraud will be more likely. The largest ray of hope that the future will 
be brighter is contained in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000,48 which made single-stock futures contracts legal for the first time in 
twenty years.49  
Single stock futures contracts are futures contracts on an eligible 
underlying equity interest. The contract is an agreement to sell shares in a 
particular issue of common stock at a designated date in the future, the 
maturity date.  
Single stock futures contracts eliminate some, but not all, of the problems 
associated with short selling. In particular, traders do not need to pay interest 
on borrowed stock when they trade in futures, nor do the need to worry about 
where to borrow the stock they are shorting. This means that traders can keep 
positions open far longer. The ability to sustain a pessimistic trading position 
for a prolonged time frame is important when there are long periods of time 
that a security is mispriced. This sustainability is probably the most important 
reason why single stock futures contracts may be more effective in dealing 
with “irrational exuberance” than short-selling.50 
Finally, while single stock futures contracts will be subject to short term 
capital gains taxes regardless of how long they are held,51 they are not subject 
to the up-tick rule. Thus, sophisticated intermediaries likely would have 
traded Enron futures contracts if such futures contracts had been available 
prior to the collapse of the company. 
As Frank Easterbrook has pointed out, sophisticated “intermediaries sold 
approximately $10 billion in Enron credit-risk derivatives” which were 
written to pay off only when the issuer defaulted.52 This reflects an 
astonishing amount of pessimism about Enron on the part of sophisticated 
is actually held before it is delivered to the lender to close the short sale. 
 48. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 49. Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 735-36 (2002) [hereinafter Easterbrook]. 
 50. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). In May 2001, a new firm, EquiLend, 
LLC, was formed by a consortium of ten leading financial institutions (Barclays Global Investors, 
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Northern Trust, State Street, and UBS Warburg) to create an electronic market for borrowing and 
lending stocks for purposes of short selling. See http://www.equilend.com. This new trading venue 
promises to make it much easier to borrow the stock necessary to engage in short selling.  
 51. Any capital gain or loss on a sale or exchange of the contract will be considered short-term, 
regardless of how long you hold the contract. For more information, see Chapter 4 of I.R.S 
PUBLICATION 550, INVESTMENT INCOME AND EXPENSES, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p550.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). 
 52. Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 735; Tom Holland, Heard in Asia: Credit Derivatives Prove 
Mettle Amid Enron Crisis, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at M1. 
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investors. It seems reasonable to surmise that if single stock futures contracts 
had been legal at the time that the Enron bubble was inflating, sales of such 
futures contracts might have moved market prices to their efficient levels.  
The market response to Enron was extremely disappointing. Professor 
Shiller’s explanations that short-selling is relatively costly, and even 
somewhat terrifying psychologically, do not account for the failure of 
arbitrageurs, hedge funds, and other professional investors to profit from 
trading on the Enron “bubble.” The assumption that sophisticated traders can 
decode opaque, complicated, or obscure financial reporting is very much in 
doubt. This, in turn, creates a significant hole in the theory of market 
efficiency.  
Such holes, however, are likely to be temporary, due to the massive 
economic gains available to those able to step in and fill them. In other 
words, the obscure nature of Enron’s financial reporting does not explain 
why there was such a delay in uncovering the problems at Enron. After all, 
the more obscure and indecipherable the financial reporting, the greater the 
potential arbitrage gains to those who are first to solve a financial puzzle. 
III. THE MANDATORY-ENABLING DEBATE: SOME WORDS ABOUT 
SARBANES-OXLEY 
The preceding analysis can provide some insight into the debate between 
those who believe in mandatory regimes for disclosure of corporate 
information and those who believe that the operative legal regime should be 
enabling in order to facilitate regulatory competition and private-sector 
innovation. Unfortunately, recent experience does not provide much basis to 
support either a mandatory or an enabling corporate law regime. On the 
supply side, Enron rose and fell in the context of one of the world’s strictest 
regimes of mandatory disclosure and reporting. The system failed miserably 
in Enron, and that failure appears to be pervasive rather than isolated.  
On the demand side, the largely unregulated participants in the capital 
markets (market professionals such as hedge funds and other financial 
intermediaries) would have profited in myriad ways from providing early 
warning of Enron’s collapse, but they also failed miserably.  
Thus, the history of Enron should not provide comfort either to those who 
champion strict regimes of mandatory disclosure or to those who champion a 
free-market system.  
Rather, I think that the critical lesson to be learned from the collapse of 
Enron is this: rather than focusing on the question whether a particular 
regulation is mandatory or enabling, government regulators and policy 
analysts should focus their efforts on facilitating those market processes that 
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promote true objectivity among outside monitors and towards generating 
better and more accurate information for internal monitors.  
Many of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley reflect these concerns; 
however, the statute takes a largely supply-side perspective in that it focuses 
on regulating the production of information. The statute does very little to 
improve the environment on the demand-side for information, despite the 
fact that Enron and its “progeny” represent a much more significant failure 
on the demand-side of the market for information than on the supply-side of 
this market. On the other hand, it seems clear that improvements in the 
competitiveness of the capital markets, particularly by doing more to 
encourage short-selling, hold far greater promise for reducing managers’ 
ability to defraud investors than tightening regulations on the supply side. 
In my view, the best way to improve the demand-side of the market 
would be to give tax and other financial incentives to short-sellers and those 
who trade single stock futures. Such legislation would have positive effects 
on the capital market far beyond the modest financial incentives that such 
provisions would provide. This is because the provisions would reflect a 
major “sea change” in attitudes about the social benefits of short-selling and 
would thereby reduce the social stigma associated with such activity. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulates the conduct of corporate officers and 
directors, as well as lawyers and accountants who perform services for public 
companies. The Act also significantly expands the scope of criminal and civil 
liability for corporate officers and directors. Significantly, however, the Act 
does not expand the scope, content, or format of corporate disclosure already 
mandated by U.S. securities laws. Instead, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 
are designed to remedy perceived deficiencies in the market processes by 
which public corporations interact with the investing public.53 This point is 
seen most clearly in the manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley addresses the 
(contractual) relationship between reporting companies and their audit firms.  
The Act, in essence, requires that accounting firms contract for their 
services not with management, but with the audit committees of the boards of 
 53. While much of Sarbanes-Oxley is consistent with the “contract-enhancing” framework 
discussed in this Article, the Act does contain some mandatory provisions, such as Public Law 107-
204 § 401(a), amending Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m), which 
requires the SEC to issue rules that require public companies to disclose all material off-balance sheet 
transactions, arrangements, obligations, and other relationships between the company and 
unconsolidated entities or other persons which may have a material effect on the company’s financial 
condition. While this provision is mandatory, it is clearly designed to remedy failures in the 
contracting process between auditors and their public company clients, as well as failures in the system 
of mandatory disclosure. It is impossible to imagine that a company contracting in good faith for the 
provision of auditing services would not contract for the disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions 
that may have a material effect on the company’s financial condition.  
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directors of the companies they propose to audit. This change in the nature of 
the contracting process between auditors and audit clients is effectuated by 
Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which stipulates that the audit committees of 
public companies “shall be directly responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting 
firm employed by the issuer (including resolution of disagreements between 
management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) . . . .”54 
The power of the audit committees of U.S. public companies is further 
bolstered by the provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that require any accounting 
firm auditing a public company to timely report to the company’s audit 
committee:  
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used; (2) all 
alternative treatments of financial information within [GAAP] that 
have been discussed with management officials of the issuer, 
ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, 
and the treatment preferred by the . . . accounting firm; and (3) other 
material written communications between the registered public 
accounting firm and the management of the issuer . . . .55 
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that audit committees set up procedures for 
handling complaints from “whistleblowers” within the company56 and for 
engaging independent legal counsel and other advisors to carry out its 
duties.57 
Perhaps the most famous provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are the new rules 
relating to “Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports.”58 These rules 
require the principal executive officer (CEO), and the principal financial 
 54. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 301 (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 204 (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 301(4) (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). This 
Section provides that public companies’ audit committees must “establish procedures” for: 
(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting, 
internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and  
(B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding 
questionable accounting or auditing matters.  
Id. Section 806 of the Act provides further protection for whistleblowers by making it illegal to 
retaliate against or to harass people who assist in an investigation of the company’s violations of 
securities laws. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 806 (2002). 
 57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §301(6)(B) (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 58. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 302 (2002). 
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officer (CFO), of a public company to certify that he or she has reviewed 
each quarterly or annual report filed with the SEC and attest that, to his or her 
knowledge, the report does not contain any material false statements or 
omissions and “fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition 
and results of operations of the [company] as of, and for, the periods 
presented in the report.” CEOs and CFOs must also certify that they “have 
evaluated the effectiveness of the [company’s] internal controls” and 
“presented . . . their conclusions about the effectiveness of [such] controls.”59 
The Act imposes criminal sanctions in the form of fines up to $1 million 
and/or up to ten years imprisonment for knowingly making false 
certifications.60  
Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, which are designed to restore the 
integrity of the public company audit process, make it unlawful for any 
person “to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead” any 
accountant performing an audit of a company’s financial statements “for the 
purpose of rendering the financial statements materially misleading.”61 Audit 
firms also are forbidden from performing audit services for a public company 
if the company’s chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, 
chief accounting officer, or similarly situated corporate official was 
employed by the accounting firm and participated in an audit of the company 
“during the one-year period preceding the date of the initiation of the 
audit.”62  
From the “mandatory-enabling” perspective of this Article, perhaps the 
most interesting provision of Sarbanes-Oxley concerns auditor rotation. The 
statute forbids accounting firms from providing audit services to public 
companies if the “lead” or “coordinating audit partner” or “the audit partner 
responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for the 
[company] in each of the [five] 5 previous fiscal years.”63 Like the provisions 
of Sarbanes-Oxley that forbid auditors from providing certain consulting and 
other ancillary services to clients,64 the obvious intent of this statutory 
 59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 302(a) (2002). 
 60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 906 (c)(1) (2002) 
(amending chapter 63 of Title 18 U.S.C. by inserting new material after existing § 1349). Willful 
violations are punished even more severely than knowing violations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 906(c)(2) (2002) (punishing willful violations with fines of up to 
$5 million and/or 20 years of imprisonment). 
 61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 303(c) (2002). 
 62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 206 (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 203 (2002) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 201(a)(2002) (to be 
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provision is to minimize the “capture” of audit firms by the issuing 
companies they are supposed to be auditing. Whether this provision will 
make things better or worse, however, remains to be seen.65 It is possible, for 
example, that auditors will now feel stronger pressures to capitulate to 
clients’ wishes because the auditor-rotation rules will lead to new intra-firm 
rivalries among accountants, as new accountants compete for higher client 
satisfaction survey results than their predecessors. 
The contractual relationship between lawyers and public companies was 
also fundamentally altered by Sarbanes-Oxley. The Act requires the SEC to 
articulate minimum standards of conduct for lawyers who practice or appear 
before the SEC in the representation of public company issuers.66 The statute 
requires the SEC to develop rules that obligate lawyers “to report evidence of 
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation by the company or any agent [of the company], to the chief legal 
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company” (or similarly situated 
officer).67 If the CEO or Chief legal counsel does not properly respond, the 
lawyer will be required to “report the evidence to the audit committee of the 
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of 
directors comprised solely of [independent] directors . . ., or to the board of 
directors” of the company.68 
The Sarbanes-Oxley provisions just discussed were designed to correct 
severe distortions that appear to have developed in the contracting process 
between corporations and their outside advisors, who ostensibly served as 
“gatekeepers” for these companies. In particular, these provisions regulate 
the most basic aspect of the contracting process by clarifying “who is 
contracting with whom” when a company retains an outside lawyer or 
accountant to represent it in interactions with the SEC and in the public 
disclosure process. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, accountants and lawyers, for all 
practical purposes, frequently contracted with management. While the 
corporation’s shareholders paid the bills, it was the managers who gave the 
outside advisors their marching orders and decided whether these outside 
advisors would be retained or awarded additional business. 
Gradually these peculiarities in the contracting process distorted the 
relationships between corporate clients and their lawyers and accountants to 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 65. See Macey & Sale, supra note 7, at 1185-86 (arguing that auditors will still be pressured by 
clients “in order to protect their own status within the firm.”).  
 66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 307 (2002). 
 67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 307(1) (2002). 
 68. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 307 (2002). 
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the degree that lawyers and accountants were often no longer acting as 
gatekeepers, but as aiders and abettors, and perhaps even as primary actors in 
the misdeeds of their clients.69 Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to cure this 
deficiency in the contracting process by placing new professional obligations 
on lawyers and by designating the public company’s audit committee, rather 
than its incumbent management, as the primary counter-party in the 
contractual relationship between audit companies and their clients.  
Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley is best viewed as a mechanism for addressing 
problems in the contracting process that had developed over time between 
public companies and the professional gatekeepers who were supposed to 
safeguard the interests of the investing public and other stakeholders in these 
firms. In this context, it is important to consider whether the legislation was 
needed, or whether it was likely (or even possible) for firms to have 
addressed these problems on their own. Certainly, even without Sarbanes-
Oxley, firms could have delegated to audit committees rather than 
management, the responsibility for selecting, evaluating and paying for audit 
firms. And Sarbanes-Oxley was not needed to empower lawyers to report 
fraud up the corporate chain of command to responsible independent 
directors. Nor was Sarbanes-Oxley required to protect whistleblowers, nor 
even to cause companies to disclose off-balance sheet items that could have a 
material effect on their financial condition. Companies, at least in theory, 
could have done all of this themselves. 
Firms could have done these things, but they did not. Professional 
advisors are rational economic actors, and like other rational economic 
actors, they respond to incentives. When incumbent management was the 
client, and management happened to be corrupt, it seems that the gatekeepers 
also became corrupted, or at least compliant. Thus, we came to a bizarre 
crossroads, where companies with honest management were served by 
honest gatekeepers, while companies with dishonest management were 
served by professionals who lacked sufficient incentives to fulfill their roles 
as gatekeepers.  
Public companies were not going to solve the contracting problem. After 
all, monitors and gatekeepers are needed in public companies precisely 
because shareholders in such companies face collective action problems 
(such as free-riding and rational ignorance) that make it difficult for 
shareholders effectively to monitor management, much less to contemplate 
 69. For an extended discussion of the role of the gatekeepers in the collapse of Enron, see In re 
Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp.2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
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the intricacies of the contracting process that goes on between the 
corporation and its auditors and lawyers. 
CONCLUSION  
Even the most ardent proponents of free-market solutions recognize that 
some centralized, societal force is necessary to facilitate the contracting 
process. At a minimum, for example, the state, (or something like it) is 
required to enforce the terms of agreements between parties. And law-and-
economics scholars also have made it clear that legal rules are useful, 
particularly in the corporate context, as a means to reduce transaction costs. 
The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley discussed in this Article may or may not 
be effective in improving confidence in public companies and their financial 
reports, but these provisions clearly restore a semblance of sanity to the 
contracting process between companies and their outside auditors.  
This Article has developed the argument that the problems in U.S. 
corporate governance reflect problems with mandatory rules, particularly 
mandatory reporting rules, as well as problems with enabling, contractual 
rules, particularly with the market-based system for receiving and analyzing 
the information that companies disclose. 
Sarbanes-Oxley was a measured and appropriate response to the abject 
failures in U.S. corporate governance typified by Enron. These failures were 
not merely failures in the system of mandatory reporting, though it is clear 
that mandatory rules did not serve us well. Rather, the corporate governance 
crisis in America, with Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both 
our system of mandatory rules, and of the contracting processes, which, 
together, constitute the infrastructure of the U.S. corporate governance 
system. 
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